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The notion of action simulation refers to the ability to re-enact foreign actions (i.e., actions
observed in other individuals). Simulating others’ actions implies a mirroring of their
activities, based on one’s own sensorimotor competencies. Here, we discuss theoretical
and experimental approaches to action simulation and the study of its representational
underpinnings. One focus of our discussion is on the timing of internal simulation and
its relation to the timing of external action, and a paradigm that requires participants to
predict the future course of actions that are temporarily occluded from view. We address
transitions between perceptual mechanisms (referring to action representation before
and after occlusion) and simulation mechanisms (referring to action representation during
occlusion). Findings suggest that action simulation runs in real-time; acting on newly
created action representations rather than relying on continuous visual extrapolations. A
further focus of our discussion pertains to the functional characteristics of the mechanisms
involved in predicting other people’s actions. We propose that two processes are engaged,
dynamic updating and static matching, which may draw on both semantic and motor
information. In a concluding section, we discuss these findings in the context of broader
theoretical issues related to action and event representation, arguing that a detailed
functional analysis of action simulation in cognitive, neural, and computational terms may
help to further advance our understanding of action cognition and motor control.
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REPRESENTATION OF OCCLUDED ACTION
In recent years, the concept of simulation has flourished within
various fields of psychological research, ranging from agency
(Ruby and Decety, 2001), action perception (Rizzolatti et al.,
1996; Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Mukamel et al., 2010), imi-
tation (Brass et al., 2001; Buccino et al., 2004), mind read-
ing (Gordon, 1996, 2001; Goldman, 2005, 2006), and empathy
(Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Gallese et al., 2004) to the study
of clinical issues like schizophrenia (Enticott et al., 2008). Across
these domains and the majority of studies, the term simula-
tion concordantly expresses the idea that humans possess non-
conceptual and direct ways of understanding others’ thoughts,
feelings, intentions and actions by mirroring or re-enacting their
mental states and physical activities (Blakemore andDecety, 2001;
Rizzolatti et al., 2006).
The present paper focuses on action simulation. It aims to
discuss theoretical and experimental approaches to action sim-
ulation and its cognitive underpinnings, broadly understood as
internal representations that parallel external action events, like
observing a friend making a cup of coffee or a couple dancing
together. From a functional point of view, internal simulations
of physical actions may improve our appraisal of actions that we
plan to perform in collaboration with others and that require
us to act in response to and in anticipation of the actions of
others (e.g., Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009; Doerrfeld et al., 2012;
Manera et al., 2013). A recent study illustrative of this demon-
strated that judgments of the weight of an object varied according
to whether the participants planned to lift the object by them-
selves or whether they planned to lift it together with a co-actor
who was either healthy or injured (Doerrfeld et al., 2012).
Here, we use the term simulation to refer to the mental opera-
tions involved in internally representing actions during so-called
visual action occlusions. In everyday life, when we watch other
people moving around us, it often happens that they disappear
from sight for amoment. However, in these situations, behaviours
and physical actions observed immediately prior to occlusion do
not just stop. Based on what we have seen before, we are usu-
ally capable of internally substituting (simulating) the invisible
parts of an action and rendering quite precise predictions about
its future course (i.e., what the agent will do, and when his/her
action will take place).
Neurophysiological evidence in monkeys demonstrates that
neurons continue to fire for some time in response to specific
actions even after these actions disappear behind an occluding
object (Umilta et al., 2001; Jellema and Perrett, 2003). In human
experiments using action occlusion paradigms, participants typ-
ically watch familiar actions that are briefly occluded from view
and then continued. A typical task is then for participants to
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indicate if the re-appearing action part (after occlusion) is an
accurate continuation of the perceived action (seen prior to occlu-
sion), or if it has changed in spatial angle (e.g., Graf et al., 2007;
Springer et al., 2011) or has jumped in time (e.g., Stadler et al.,
2012b). High accuracy on this task requires a precise internal rep-
resentation (simulation) of the occluded action part, and factors
that influence performance can then be measured. For instance,
Stadler et al. (2012b) examined the accuracy of action simula-
tion when the observed actors moved according to human-like
vs. artificial motion profiles whose kinematics had been changed
according to a non-human, constant velocity. Under conditions
with temporary occlusions, observers were clearly more able
to predict human-like actions compared to non-human actions
(Stadler et al., 2012b), highlighting the fundamental susceptibil-
ity of the human action simulation system (Parkinson et al., 2012;
Saygin and Stadler, 2012; see Gowen and Poliakoff, 2012, for a
review).
Since temporary occlusions require switching back and forth
between externally guided perception and internal representa-
tions (simulations), action occlusion paradigms, further, allow
the study of these two phases separately and in terms of their
interrelations. In an illustrative study by Prinz and Rapinett
(2008), the participants observed a human hand transporting
an object. After a moment, the hand with the object was briefly
occluded from view. Participants were required to make a judg-
ment about the time that they thought the transporting hand
with the object would reappear from behind the occluding object
(Figure 5). Results indicated a substantial positive time error (i.e.,
lag effect), meaning that the continuation of the action after
occlusion was judged to be “just in time” when the point of reap-
pearance was slightly shifted ahead (by 20–100ms). This finding
provided a first insight into the timing and nature of internal
action representations (simulations) during occlusions, suggest-
ing that themental operations called up during occlusions involve
the generation of novel action representations rather than just
pure extrapolation of perceived movement trajectories (Prinz and
Rapinett, 2008).
The authors of this study put forward that these issues are
based on the assumption that unlike action perception, which
naturally draws on external resources derived from actual stim-
ulation, action simulation draws on internal resources derived
from stored knowledge (cf. Prinz and Rapinett, 2008). In the
following section, we focus on the temporal characteristics of
action simulation. Based on the experimental evidence from
different occlusion tasks, we propose that action simulation
engages internal online processes operating in real-time, which
act on newly created action representations rather than rely-
ing on continuous visual extrapolations of observed movement
trajectories.
In Section Representational Mechanisms, we discuss another
strand of experimental studies that have explored the procedu-
ral and representational characteristics of the processes engaged
for solving action occlusion tasks. Two major findings emerge.
Firstly, predicting occluded actions may engage two distinct pro-
cesses: dynamic simulation and static matching. Both processes
do not by themselves speak to the representational format in
which they occur (e.g., simulation/matching in the motor and/or
visual domain). Secondly, two different kinds of representational
domainsmay be involved: sensorimotor processes (those involved
in an observers’ own physical activity) and semantic processes
(those involved in understanding action-related verbal contents).
In a concluding section, we propose that the concept of internal
action simulation can be related to a predictive coding account
of motor control (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007), in correspondence
with the broader notion that humans can use their motor sys-
tem to simulate and predict others’ actions (Grèzes and Decety,
2001; Jeannerod, 2001). In line with this notion, action simula-
tion may also be linked to embodied views of language, holding
that processing verbal and conceptual action-related information
is strongly linked to (and may even rely on) information process-
ing in sensory and motor domains (e.g., Barsalou, 2003, 2008;
Zwaan, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005, 2008; Glenberg, 2008; Mahon
and Caramazza, 2008, 2009).
TIME COURSE
SIMULATION IN REAL TIME: THE OCCLUDER PARADIGM
The first research into real-time action simulation used what we
refer to as the occluder paradigm, first developed by Graf et al.
(2007). This paradigm has been used, with some novel varia-
tions, in subsequent research on action simulation (Prinz and
Rapinett, 2008; Parkinson et al., 2011; Sparenberg et al., 2012).
The occluder paradigm is based on the hypothesis that when we
observe a human moving, who is then occluded from view—
perhaps he or she disappears behind a fence—an internal action
simulation runs in real-time predicting the on-going motion.
Then the person reappears in view at a point in the motion that
either matches or does not match that internal real-time sim-
ulation. In this way, the spatiotemporal accuracy of the action
simulation and the ability of people to use action simulation to
aid their perception and prediction of human movement can be
tested.
The original occluder paradigm (Graf et al., 2007) used rep-
resentations of human motion known as point-light actors (PLAs;
Johansson, 1973), which convey motion via a group of moving
dots that track the motion of the major joints of the human body.
These stimuli have been widely used to examine human move-
ment processing (Johansson, 1973, 1976; Cutting et al., 1988).
Graf et al.’s (2007) original studies used PLA stimuli of non-
cyclical human motions, such as performing a basketball shot or
hitting a tennis ball. The PLA was presented to the participant for
a short period of 2–4 s before being occluded from view for a fixed
amount of time (occluder time; 100, 400 or 700ms, see Figure 1).
Following this, a static test posture of the action was presented
that was either rotated around the actor’s vertical axis, as if he had
suddenly spun to the left or the right, or in the correct orientation,
as if he had continued smoothly on in his motion. The partici-
pants’ task was to judge whether this rotation had occurred or not
(yes/no response). Crucially, and independent of the spatial ori-
entation, the test posture was either a congruent or incongruent
continuation of the motion. That is, if the test posture was con-
gruent, it was taken from the point in the motion that the actor
would have reached if he had continued for the exact duration
of the occluder. In this condition, the test posture should match
the state of the internal real-time simulation. In the incongruent
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the stimuli utilized in Graf et al. (2007). Point light actions were presented and then occluded for a variable time (100, 400, or
700ms). Occlusion was followed by a test pose that was rotated or in the correct orientation. Pose time was also varied (100, 400, or 700ms).
conditions, the test posture was from a point of the motion that
was too early or too late with respect to the exact occlusion period.
In this case, the test posture would not match the current state of
the real-time action simulation. The occlusion period is referred
to as the pose time (which, again, can take three values, 100, 400
or 700ms, see Figure 1).
The hypothesis was that if the test posture matched the cur-
rent state of the action simulation, then the orientation judgment
would be easier and more successful. This was indeed the case:
error rates for congruent continuations were less than those for
incongruent continuations across different occluded durations, a
finding that was demonstrated across a number of different types
of human motions. This was the first evidence that the real-time
action simulation existed and that it could be tested by utilizing
its beneficial effects in visual judgment tasks. Graf et al. (2007)
conducted a further experiment using PLAs that were inverted on
their vertical axis; it is well-known that it is difficult to perceive
human motion under these conditions. The results showed that
there was no judgment-benefit for the congruent test postures
compared to the incongruent ones. This suggested that the effects
seen in the earlier studies were specific to human motion itself
and not some more generalized visual predictive system. That is,
the real-time simulation is specifically concerned with predicting
coherent examples of human actions.
BENEFITS OF REAL-TIME SIMULATION
Having described the occluder paradigm for testing action simu-
lation, we will now review recent research that has used and fur-
ther developed it to measure various aspects of action simulation,
such as its precise time course, its susceptibility to online change,
and its role in the direct visual perception of human motion.
Detection thresholds
First, we consider the advantageous role that real-time action sim-
ulation has in the visual processing of human motion. That is,
can we show that the action simulation can provide a here-and-
now, or predictive, benefit to visual perception? Imagine watching
a football match on television. The TV is an old analogue set and
is fed by a radio antenna on the roof. It’s windy, the antenna is
blown around, and the TV picture is occasionally replaced with
“snow”: the random cascade of black and white dots that repre-
sent a lack of signal. A player is about to score when he disappears
briefly under this visual snow and you are trying to keep track of
him until he reappears on the screen in the haze of bad picture
quality.
We argue that this is when action simulation might occur:
you generate a real-time model of a player’s movements whilst
he is briefly occluded from view. This example also illustrates
what may be an adaptive benefit of the real-time action simu-
lation: if the internal model tracks the exact time-course of the
player’s movements, the model can then be used to provide a per-
ceptual prediction—also in real-time—of how the player should
look at any moment during occlusion. If the figure is not fully
occluded but simply visually degraded, the perceptual prediction
may provide real-time support to the visual system, aiding the
detection and processing of the faintly seen player. Importantly,
if the faintly reappearing player was not then moving in a way
consistent with the real-time predictive simulation—the video
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 387 | 3
Springer et al. Cognitive underpinnings of action simulation
had skipped forward or backwards, for example—the simulation
would provide no such predictive benefit.
This was the rationale behind a recent set of experiments
(Parkinson et al., 2011) in which PLAs were presented on top of a
constantly changing random pattern of black and white pixels in
a 50/50 ratio, resembling TV “noise.” The points of the actor were
squares of pixels that could also be rendered as randomized pat-
terns of black and white dots, with a variable ratio of white dots
to black dots. If the ratio of white dots was 100%, the actor was
clearly visible. However, as the white ratio was reduced the actor
was less visible against the background noise, until a 50% ratio
rendered him totally invisible (see Figure 2A).
In each trial, the participants were presented with back-
ground noise that continuously changed throughout the trials.
Participants clearly saw the initial part of the action, which we
refer to as the prime motion, as it was the section of motion that
was assumed to prime the generation of the subsequent action
simulation. Then the actor was occluded from view for a short
period (400ms) after which he reappeared, inmotion, for 400ms.
This was the test motion that was presented with variable visibil-
ity against the background (see Figure 2B). The participants’ task
was to indicate whether they saw the reappearing actor or not,
with test motion visibility adaptively altered to reach set detection
rate targets. Thus, detection thresholds for the test motion could
be measured in terms of the ratio of white pixels depicting the
test motion actor. This was an indicator of how easy participants
found it to detect the reappearing actor under difficult visual
conditions.
It is important to note that this detection task is a simple,
immediate “here-and-now” judgment, as opposed to the more
FIGURE 2 | A schematic illustration of a trial in which the PLA was
presented with variable visibility against the background. (A) Shows how
varying white pixel ratio in the actor’s joints increases visibility against the
noise background, (B) shows a basic trial sequence, and (C) depicts a
schematic showing how different sections of the action were shown as the
prime motion to manipulate motion congruency with the same test motion
section. Figure adapted from Parkinson et al. (2011, p. 1466). Copyright © The
Experimental Psychology Society. Adapted with permission of Taylor and
Francis Ltd., www.tandfonline.com on behalf of The Experimental
Psychology Society, with permission from the authors.
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postdictive one used in the original Graf et al. (2007) paradigm.
That is, participants were not asked to make any judgment about
the quality of the reappearing actor (e.g., whether he had turned
or not), but quite simply whether he had reappeared at all. Thus,
this paradigm made it possible to measure whether action simu-
lation aided the basic visual prediction and subsequent detection
of human motion (i.e., detection thresholds). An action simu-
lation would be generated during the occlusion, which was a
continuation of the prime motion seen prior to occlusion. In
order to test the simulation’s effect on test motion detection, the
spatiotemporal relationship between the prime motion and the
test motion was manipulated. This meant that the action sim-
ulation would be congruent with the test motion, or the test
motion would be “too early” or “too late” to match the action
simulation (incongruent conditions). To avoid confounds of test
motion on detection thresholds, the same section of test motion
was used in all congruent and incongruent conditions. Thus, the
spatiotemporal manipulations were achieved by presenting dif-
ferent sections of prime motion, which would subsequently drive
different action simulations in relation to the single test motion
(see Figure 2C).
Detection thresholds were measured for a variety of actions
in three conditions: action simulation-congruent test motions,
incongruent early test motions, or incongruent late test motions.
Congruent thresholds were consistently lower than those for
either of the incongruent condition. Hence, if the currently gen-
erated action simulation was temporally congruent with the test
motion, the latter was more easily detected. These experiments
suggest that the action simulation can have a direct, immediate,
here-and-now benefit for the perception of human movement,
but only when the external stimulus of movement temporally
matches the internal action simulation. This suggests some form
of on-going, real-time, top-down effect of action simulation on
ongoing visual processes, and supports the notion that internal
forward models for biological motion and action can be used to
directly supplement the perception of those actions (Wilson and
Knoblich, 2005; Prinz, 2006).
Inserted motion
Another consideration in understanding action simulation is
how stable the internal real-time model of motion is. In other
words, is it possible to briefly bias, or indeed replace, the current
ongoing action simulation by very briefly introducing human
motion information that does not match the current state of the
ongoing simulation process? Parkinson et al. (2012; Experiment
2) investigated this question by adding “inserted motion” in
the occluder. Specifically, PLAs were presented that were briefly
occluded for 500ms and then reappeared in motion for 500ms
(i.e., test motions). These test motions were either temporally
congruent with the ongoing action simulation at that point or
were temporally incongruent, that is, offset 267ms too early or
too late in the motion sequences. The participants were asked
to make an explicit 2-alternative forced-choice judgment as to
whether the test motion was a correct continuation or not, that
is, the judgment measured how well the test motion matched
the action simulation that was being generated at that point
in time.
Around the temporal halfway point of the occlusion period,
67ms (4 frames) of low contrast PLA was presented, such that
participants got the impression of a brief “flash” of motion within
the occlusion period (see Figure 3). Crucially, the inserted motion
was either temporally congruent with the action simulation or too
early or too late by 267ms. In the congruent instance, the inserted
motion matched the action simulation, almost as if the ongoing
action was seen very briefly through a slit in the occlusion period.
In the two incongruent instances, the inserted motion would not
match the ongoing action simulation. The hypothesis was that,
despite the brevity of the inserted motion, it would nevertheless
act to bias or replace the action simulation.
The experiment, thus, represented a 3 (test motion offset) × 3
(inserted motion offset) design, with the measurement being the
percentage of trials in which the participants judged the test
motion to be a “correct continuation.” The results are shown in
Figure 4. When the inserted motion matched the action simu-
lation (0ms offset, central cluster), it did not interfere with the
action simulation process and the results were as expected: par-
ticipants were more likely to judge the congruent test motion as
correct, as opposed to either of the incongruent test motions,
showing that they could utilize the action simulation to cor-
rectly judge the veracity of the test motion. However, the pat-
tern of results was distinctly different when the inserted motion
was incongruent with the action simulation: when the inserted
motion was offset in one temporal direction, judgments of
what was a correct test motion also shifted in that temporal
direction.
This suggests that the action simulation process can be
updated “mid-flow” by new incoming motion information, no
matter how briefly that new motion is perceived for. This is
perhaps unsurprising because an action simulation process that
remains immune to change may not be a very useful mechanism
for predicting the ongoing movements of others. Two possibil-
ities arise as to how the inserted motion effects this updating
of the action simulation: firstly, the biasing hypothesis suggests
that briefly presented motion that does not temporally match
the current state of the action simulation acts to fluidly update
it, temporally “pushing” the action simulation in that direction.
The second hypothesis suggests that re-simulation occurs: per-
ceiving even a short duration of inserted motion cancels the
currently generated action simulation and generates a new one
based on the new motion information. Naturally, if the inserted
motion matches the old simulation, the new one will roughly
match the old one, leading to the expected results, as seen in
the 0ms inserted offset condition described above. However, if
the re-simulation is based upon temporally shifted motion, the
newly generated simulation will perceptually support “incorrect”
continuation test motions.
Both of these hypotheses are possible and the current evidence
does not conclusively support one or the other (Parkinson et al.,
2012). It might seem, on the face of it, that the re-simulation
hypothesis is less intuitively sensible, since it would entail that an
entirely new action simulation can be accurately generated from
only 67ms of a PLA motion. In fact, this is entirely feasible, as we
will see later (Section The Lag Effect: Towards a Higher Temporal
Resolution).
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FIGURE 3 | A schematic illustration of a trial with “inserted motion” during the occlusion phase.
FIGURE 4 | Percentage correct judgments for the “inserted motion”
experiment. Black asterisks connected with solid lines indicate
significance levels of between-condition t-test comparisons. Asterisks in
gray connected with dotted lines indicate significance levels of one-sample
t-test comparisons to chance performance (50%), ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001. Figure reproduced from Parkinson et al. (2012, p. 428).
Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media. Reproduced with
permission.
THE LAG EFFECT: TOWARDS A HIGHER TEMPORAL RESOLUTION
We have described recent research, which, in the first instance,
shows the existence of real-time action simulation of human
motion (Graf et al., 2007; Parkinson et al., 2011). Secondly, we
have demonstrated an ecologically valid real-world benefit of
action simulation, which can act in a top-down fashion to aid
human motion detection (Parkinson et al., 2011). Finally, we
went on to illustrate the fluid, updatable nature of the simulation
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(Parkinson et al., 2012). Now, we turn to the investigation of
the spatiotemporal accuracy of the action simulation: the more
fine-grained nature of how well the simulation can track human
motion.
Spatial occlusion and the teapot experiment
Work by Prinz and Rapinett (2008) attempted to investigate the
time-course and accuracy of action simulation by asking how it
relates, at first, to simple visual linear extrapolation. They used
a novel version of the occluder paradigm, which used actual
video footage of people making simple goal-directed motions.
The actors of these videos sat facing the viewer but hidden behind
a permanently present cardboard occluder (see Figure 5). The
motions they performed were simple, manual transport move-
ments, such as reaching with their right hand for a teapot on
their right (screen-left), picking it up, and moving it screen-right
behind the occluder, to reappear screen-right of the occluder
where a mug or cup awaited the teapot. Since the occluder was
onscreen throughout, the moments and position of the start of
the occlusion were highly predictable, as was the spatial position
of reappearance considering the linear left-right trajectory of the
transport motion. Therefore, the experiment was ideally suited
to measure the spatiotemporal accuracy of the action simula-
tion by examining participants’ judgments of the time the teapot
reappeared from the right-edge of the occluder.
The teapot could reappear either at the correct time, as if the
motion had continued as normal behind the occluder, or too late
or too early in steps of 40ms. Participants judged whether the
teapot appeared too late, just in time, or too early. When the “just
in time” judgments were analyzed, it was found that there was a
FIGURE 5 | Illustration of the experimental setting as seen through the
eyes of the participant. On each trial the actor (sitting behind an occluding
object) transported a teapot from a home position to a target position.
Figure adapted from Prinz and Rapinett (2008) (p. 226). Copyright by IOS
Press. Adapted with permission.
positive time error in the judgments. That is, the reappearances
participants thought were correct were, in fact, too late. This sug-
gests that the action simulation is not entirely accurate in tracking
ongoing occluded motion; there is some temporal lag present.
Figure 6A schematically illustrates these results on the assump-
tion that the transport motion (solid black line) has a constant
velocity as the teapot is moved from screen left to right. The black
dotted line represents the occluded portion of the motion. This
would also represent the trajectory of an accurate action simu-
lation: one without lag. The gray line represents the perceived
trajectory of the teapot after occlusion, with a positive time lag,
which equates with the time lag in the “just in time” judgments.
Retaining the assumption that an action simulation has a lin-
ear velocity profile like the action it represents, there are two
possible sources for the judgment error. Firstly, the generated
action simulation may be slower than the actual action. This
is called the slope error, and is represented in Figure 6B as the
solid gray line within the occluder. The second source of error
comes from instances where the action simulation matches the
real action in terms of speed, but there is a time-cost involved
in generating an action simulation, which means it lags behind
the action by a set amount from the start. This is represented as
the dotted line in the occluder in Figure 6B, and is known as the
intercept error. The two errors are not mutually exclusive.
In order to ascertain which of the two errors contributes to
the lag in continuation judgments described above Prinz and
Rapinett (2008), conducted a second experiment in which two
different sizes of occluder and two different speeds of motion
were used. Altering the occluder size changes both the distance
over which the action is occluded and the time taken until reap-
pearance (Figure 6C). Altering the speed of the motion alters the
amount of time it takes the motion to cross the same occluder
distance (Figure 6D). In both cases the slope and intercept error
hypotheses make markedly different predictions. The simulations
affected by intercept errors are shown in dotted gray lines, and
those affected by the slope error are in solid gray. Because the
time cost involved will occur from the start of simulation, this
lag should be constant, irrespective of the occluder size, and so
judgment lags will remain constant across occluder conditions.
However, the slope error hypothesis implies that the longer the
action is occluded for, the more the lag increases. Hence, a larger
occluder should produce more error than a smaller occluder
(Figure 6C). Similarly, increasing the speed of the action and,
thus, decreasing occlusion time should, according to the slope
hypothesis, decrease lag error, whilst again the intercept error
suggests that lag will be the same irrespective of action speed
(Figure 6D).
However, when an experiment was run combining two trans-
port speeds with two occluder widths, the results were the oppo-
site of the predictions of both the slope and the intercept error
hypotheses, with lag error being smaller for slower action speeds,
and smaller for longer occluders. This means, firstly that the
constant cost (intercept) hypothesis must be rejected, because it
predicted that error would be constant. Interestingly, however, it
also suggests that the source of the lag error cannot be a slowing
of a linear extrapolation (slope error) because the results are the
opposite of what that hypothesis predicts.
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Since the available evidence did not support action simula-
tion as a simple, linear extrapolation of the occluded motion,
Prinz and Rapinett (2008) went on to reconsider the nature of
the simulation: First, they included more details about the spa-
tiotemporal properties of goal-directed movements, namely that
a goal-directed transport movement tends to have a period of
acceleration at the start and a deceleration toward the goal at
the end. Second, they suggested that rather than being a simple
extrapolation or continuation of the movement, the action sim-
ulation is actually an internally generated re-start of the motion.
As the visual input of the goal-directed input is removed at the
occluded edge, the action simulation may generate a model of
a similar goal-directed action with the same target (end-point)
but with a new start point that of the occluded edge. This means
that the action simulation entails a period of acceleration from
its own start, then moves and decelerates toward the exact same
spatiotemporal target of the original action. Figure 7A shows the
velocity profile of the action as it accelerates from the start and
decelerates at the target (black solid line) with the occluded por-
tion dotted. The re-generated action simulation is shown in gray,
with a similar accelerating-decelerating profile. The thick line on
the right side of the occluder highlights the magnitude of the lag
error. Figure 7B shows how this re-generated simulation hypoth-
esis can account for the previously puzzling results: faster actions
produce more lag error than slower actions and larger occluders
produce more error than smaller occluders.
In a final experiment, Prinz and Rapinett (2008) looked at
the effects of implied goal duration and produced a remark-
ably effective demonstration that action simulation involves the
internal modeling of goal-oriented human action and not merely
visual prediction of kinematics: they used the same video-based
paradigm involving a left–right teapot transport with two differ-
ent occluder widths. In addition, they varied the visual identity
of the target item between a small cup and a large mug. The
large mug would take longer to fill than the small cup, so the
length of time taken to achieve the action-goal should be longer
for the mug than the cup. While the videos of the reappearing
movement always stopped at the same point, just before the con-
tents of the teapot were about to be poured, a greater positive lag
error was observed in response to the mug compared to the cup
FIGURE 6 | Panel (A) shows the actual movement of an object behind the
occluder (black lines) and the action simulation (gray line) illustrating lag error.
Panel (B) shows two sources of the lag error: intercept (dotted gray) and
slope (solid gray) lines. Panel (C) shows the different predictions of the two
sources of lag error when occluder duration changes. Panel (D) shows the
different predictions of the two sources of lag error when motion speed
changes. See text for detailed explanations. Figure adapted from Prinz and
Rapinett (2008) (p. 226). Copyright by IOS Press. Adapted with permission.
FIGURE 7 | Panel (A) shows the velocity profile of the action as it
accelerates from the start and decelerates at the target (black solid line)
with the occluded portion dotted. The regenerated action simulation is
shown in gray. Panel (B) shows how this regenerated simulation
hypothesis provides different predictions when occluder duration and
action speed change. Panel (C) shows how action simulations might be
affected by the implied goal of the action. Figure adapted from Prinz and
Rapinett (2008) (p. 226). Copyright by IOS Press. Adapted with permission.
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targets, meaning that the greater amount of time implied for fill-
ing the mug had increased the target time for the generated action
simulation (see Figure 7C).
This work by Prinz and Rapinett (2008) simply, but effectively,
demonstrates a number of details regarding both the generation
and the spatiotemporal details of action simulation. Firstly, the
simulation is not merely a linear extrapolation or continuation of
the perceptual information; indeed, it seems not to be a continu-
ation at all. Instead, it may actually be that an entirely new model
of the goal-directed action that has been occluded is generated,
but starting from the point of occlusion, and this re-generation
utilizes goal-directed kinematic information inherent in action
systems. In this sense, the re-generation may, in fact, be more
closely tied to motor systems than perceptual systems, in that it
uses goal-directed motor information to supply the perceptual
information, a notion put forward by Prinz (2006) and Wilson
and Knoblich (2005).
Sparenberg et al. (2012) took a more detailed look at the
lag error in action simulation measured by Prinz and Rapinett
(2008). They used PLA stimuli and a 300ms occluder period,
after which they showed a static test posture, which could be off-
set earlier or later than the true posture of the actor immediately
following occlusion. Participants were asked if the test posture
was too late or too early to be the correct continuation of the
motion. Results showed that test postures that were too early in
the sequence were judged to be a correct continuation. That is,
over a fixed period of occluder time, the action simulation lags
behind the true motion. When Sparenberg et al. (2012) mea-
sured this lag over two different occluder durations, they found
that the lag did not change but remained constant at 25ms lag
error. This contradicted the findings of Prinz and Rapinett (2008)
that the error reduced with longer occlusion durations (and also
movement speed, not manipulated by Sparenberg et al., 2012),
and varied between 18 and 141ms. Sparenberg et al. (2012) con-
cluded that the stable lag error was a result of a constant time-cost
when switching from perception of motion to internal action
simulation.
It should be noted that, on closer inspection, it is very dif-
ficult to directly compare the two paradigms. For instance, in
the stimuli used by Prinz and Rapinett (2008), the occluder was
permanently visible, meaning that the point of occlusion was spa-
tially and temporally predictable, and the point of reappearance
was at least spatially predictable. In comparison, in Sparenberg
et al. (2012) the “occluder square” would suddenly appear and
then disappear on the screen, meaning that the spatiotemporal
point of occlusion was less predictable, and the position of the
reappearing test posture was also not predicted by any prop-
erties of the occluder. Secondly, the nature and complexity of
the motions that were to be simulated differed greatly between
paradigms: the Prinz and Rapinett (2008) transport movement
is much more linear in nature than the full body motions used
by Sparenberg et al. (2012). This action also only uses a single
limb and the individual arm movement has a clearly defined (or
implied) end-point or goal.
The combination of predictable occluder onset and offset,
plus the simpler, linear quality of the motion in the Prinz and
Rapinett (2008) paradigm may contribute to a greater ability to
simulate a goal-directed end-point for those actions and thus
produce an action simulation with the spatiotemporal properties
shown in Figure 7. In this situation, lag error will vary according
to occluder duration and action speed, as previously discussed
(Figure 7B). On the other hand, it may not be possible to gen-
erate a simulation based on a goal-directed end-point for more
complex full body motions, as used in Sparenberg et al. (2012). In
this case, the action simulation may predict the ongoing complex
motion in a more linear fashion, meaning constant lag costs irre-
spective of occluder duration. Further experiments are needed to
tackle this issue.
Still, the findings from both paradigms are informative regard-
ing the nature of action simulation and its underlying dynamic
processes, suggesting that, whilst the precise temporal nature of
the simulation may vary with the type of action being simulated,
the existence of temporal lag is common.
Motion information required for action simulation generation
As described earlier, Prinz and Rapinett (2008) suggested that
action simulation is not merely a perceptual–continuation mech-
anism but is instead a generative internal modeling that uses
information about the perceived motion—and perhaps also
motoric knowledge regarding that action—to produce a new
goal-directed simulation of the action. If the simulation is gen-
erated using motor as well as perceptual information, a pertinent
question to ask is: exactly how much visual motion information
is required to generate the action simulation?
To test this issue, Parkinson et al. (2012; Experiment 1) used a
PLA version of the paradigm, in which the initial prime motion
of the PLA was occluded for 500ms followed by 500ms of the
reappearing actor in motion. The crucial manipulation was the
duration of the pre-occluder motion: with each frame of the PLA
animation lasting 10ms, the prime duration was varied to be
either 20, 50, 100, 500, or 1000ms (i.e., the last condition only
presented 2 frames of PLA motion before the occluder). Different
sections of test motion were presented in method of constant
stimulus (MOCS) fashion and participants were asked to judge
if the test motion was too early or too late to be a correct con-
tinuation. This allowed the accuracy of the action simulations in
terms of its temporal lag to be computed in a similar way to that
used by Prinz and Rapinett (2008).
The mean lag errors for each of the prime motion durations
are shown in Figure 8. The lag errors are all negative, meaning
that participants tended to judge early offset test motions as being
correct continuations. This implies that the action simulation is
running slightly slower than the action it is being generated to
predict. This is a result we have already encountered in Section
The Lag Effect: Towards A Higher Temporal Resolution where the
Prinz and Rapinett (2008) and Sparenberg et al. (2012) studies
are detailed. What is remarkable in Parkinson et al. (2012) exper-
iment is that the temporal accuracy of the action simulation was
not affected by the amount of human motion provided before
the occluder: even when presented with as little as 20 or 50ms of
PLA motion (2 or 5 frames), the generated action simulation was
just as temporally accurate as it was when participants saw 1 s of
motion before the occluder.
Of course, during the course of an experiment the actions
will become familiar, so generating a simulation from a brief
glimpse of a PLA may not be a finding that will generalize to
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FIGURE 8 | Bar graphs of lag error in action simulation motion
judgments when different durations of motion are shown prior to
occlusion. Figure adapted from Parkinson et al. (2012, p. 426). Copyright ©
Springer Science + Business Media. Adapted with permission.
other situations, but it is still an interesting finding. This relates to
Section Benefits of Real-Time Simulation, in which we described
how inserting a very brief amount of point light motion within
the occluder can bias subsequent judgments of reappearing
motion (Parkinson et al., 2011). We suggested two mechanisms
for this: 1) that the inserted motion biases the currently gener-
ated action simulation, or 2) that the inserted motion is used as
the basis for a re-simulation and the generation of an entirely
new action simulation based on the new motion percept. At first
the re-simulation notion seems less appealing: is 67ms of human
motion enough to generate a whole new predictive model?
However, the results of the experiment by Parkinson et al.
(2012) point to just this and it had been shown previously that
very brief exposures to biological motion can provide enough
information for adequate processing (Thirkettle et al., 2009). The
results of Parkinson et al. (2012) suggest that the action sim-
ulation is remarkable in that it can generate real-time motion
predictions from very short exposure to familiar human move-
ments, and this perhaps accounts for the results when brief
conflicting motion information is inserted in the occluder: the
action simulation is re-started using the new motion section. The
notion of re-simulation is also appealing in light of the hypothesis
brought forward by Prinz andRapinett (2008), namely that action
simulation involves the generation of an internal forward model
that combines current motion information, motor knowledge,
and information about the implied end-point of the motion.
AN INTERIM SUMMARY
Action simulation is a process that internally models human
movements in real-time. The process of action simulation can be
demonstrated and investigated using the occluder paradigm (Graf
et al., 2007; Prinz and Rapinett, 2008), in which a human actor
disappears from view and then reappears at a position/motion–
continuation which can be either correct—as if they had contin-
ued moving behind the occluder—or from too late or too early
in the sequence—as if the “video” of the motion skipped for-
ward or back. When participants are tested on some orthogonal
aspect of the reappearing actor, for example when asked “Has her
form been rotated?”, they perform better when the test position
of the actor is correct with respect to the length of the occlu-
sion. This demonstrates that the action simulation is real-time in
nature, modeling the position of the occluded actor at that tem-
poral point (cf. Section Simulation in Real Time: The Occluder
Paradigm).
Action simulation has been demonstrated to directly aid the
visual perception of a visually degraded human motion, but only
when that motion spatiotemporally matches the real-time state of
the action simulation (Sections Benefits of Real-Time Simulation
and Detection thresholds). We have detailed how visual exposure
to even very short durations of human motion can provide suffi-
cient information to generate an action simulation (Sections The
Lag Effect: Towards A Higher Temporal Resolution and Motion
information required for action simulation generation). We have
also described the way in which the ongoing time-course of the
action simulation can be manipulated by displaying very short
sections of the motion during occlusion, which could again be
either temporally congruent with—or earlier or later than—the
real-time state of the action simulation at that point. These tended
to bias judgments of which reappearing motion was a “correct
continuation” in the temporal direction of the inserted motion
(Section Benefits of Real-Time Simulation, “Inserted motion”).
This illustrates that the action simulation can be updated in
real-time.
Finally, whilst it is clear that the action simulation is real-time,
in that it unfolds over time as the real action does, the simula-
tion slightly lags the action (Section The Lag Effect: Towards A
Higher Temporal Resolution, “Spatial Occlusion and the Teapot
Experiment”). Research into the source of this lag error has
suggested that the simulation itself is not simply a linear extrapo-
lation of the visual motion of the action before occlusion. Instead,
the process of action simulation involves an internal generation of
a model of the movement that includes the velocity and accelera-
tion profiles of a newly initiated goal-directed action. This model
uses the spatiotemporal point of occlusion as the starting point
and the implied goal of the action as its end point. Taken together,
we see that action simulation is a process which generates a real-
time model of an action that takes into account the goals of the
action, probably using one’s own implicit motor knowledge, and
that the action simulation can be dynamically updated and pro-
vide direct perceptual benefits when a human motion is difficult
to see.
REPRESENTATIONAL MECHANISMS
While the studies discussed above indicated that perceptual pro-
cesses can strongly impact how we perceive and predict others’
actions, a number of significant unexplored questions regarding
the role of motor processes remain. In the following, we discuss
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this issue based on studies examining how an observer’s own
physical activity may affect his or her ability to accurately simulate
and predict others’ actions.
SENSORIMOTOR PROCESSES
A wealth of experimental research has demonstrated strong
mutual influences between action perception and execution (for a
review see Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). Whilemotion detec-
tion is impaired when the motions go in the same direction as
concurrently performed actions (Hamilton et al., 2004; Zwickel
et al., 2007), movement execution depends on similarity-based
relationships between go-signals andmovements to be performed
(Brass et al., 2001; Craighero et al., 2002) and exhibits greater
variability when a different movement is concurrently observed
(Kilner et al., 2003).
Recent experiments have studied how the representational
resources involved in action simulation may be related to the
resources involved in action execution and asked: does action exe-
cution affect the performance in occluded action tasks considered
to reflect internal action simulation? In one of these studies, par-
ticipants observed arm movements of a PLA while performing a
corresponding arm movement themselves (Springer et al., 2011).
The executed and observed movements were synchronized; fur-
thermore, they were either fully congruent (i.e., involving the
same anatomical body side and the same movement pattern; full
overlap) or they were fully incongruent on both dimensions (no
overlap), or they differed in either the anatomical body side used
or in the movement pattern involved (partial overlap). For exam-
ple, in a no overlap trial, the participant reached out his right arm
to the right side, while the PLA lifted his left arm upwards over
his head.
In each trial, the observed action was briefly occluded and then
continued by the presentation of a static test pose (Graf et al.,
2007). Participants indicated whether the test pose depicted a
spatially coherent continuation of the previous arm movement.
Two factors were manipulated: occluder time (the duration of
occlusion) and pose time (the time at which the posture shown
after occlusion was actually taken from the occluded movement),
and each of them could take three values (100, 400 and 700ms;
as already explained in Section Simulation in Real Time: The
Occluder Paradigm; Figure 1).
If real-time simulation takes place, response accuracy should
be best when the occluder time (OT) and the pose time (PT)
match, because then the internal representation (updated in real-
time) should match the actual test pose (Graf et al., 2007). In
addition, performance should yield amonotonic distance function,
which emerges from the three levels of absolute time distances
between the OT and PT (i.e., 0, 300 and 600ms). If the two
times match perfectly (i.e., no time distance), the test posture
is presented just in time. Running a real-time simulation of the
occluded action means an internal representation is run and
updated, which can be used as a reference for evaluating the
upcoming test pose. If real-time simulation occurs, that internal
reference would, in the 0ms distance condition, precisely match
the test pose—whereas that match should be weaker in the con-
ditions with a temporal distance of either 300 or 600ms. This is
reflected by a monotonic distance function, that is, a monotonic
decrease of response accuracy with increasing temporal distance
(e.g., Graf et al., 2007; Springer and Prinz, 2010). This descrip-
tion of the logic of the occluder paradigm by Graf et al. (2007) is
a more technical recapitulation of the description already given
earlier on in Section Simulation in Real Time: The Occluder
Paradigm.
If internal simulation involves motor resources, the distance
function should vary depending on the conditions of motor exe-
cution. This was, in fact, indicated. A monotonic distance effect
(indicating real-time simulation) emerged when the observer’s
own movements were similar (but not identical) to the PLA’s
movements (i.e., partial overlap). In contrast, there was nomono-
tonic distance effect for full overlap and no overlap (i.e., when
both movements involved the same body sides and movement
patterns and different body sides and movement patterns, respec-
tively). This finding suggests that the degree of a representational
overlap between performed and observed actions (e.g., Hommel
et al., 2001) influenced the action simulation, as indicated by a
monotonic distance effect.
However, spatial congruence may matter (Craighero et al.,
2002; Kilner et al., 2009). That is, in one of the conditions of par-
tial overlap, executed and observed movements involved the same
movement pattern and occurred at the same side of the screen.
This condition clearly showed a monotonic distance effect (i.e.,
real-time simulation). Hence, spatial congruence may have acted
to increase the likelihood with which the participants engaged in
internal action simulation when solving the task.
To test this alternative, an additional experiment was run
in which participants were instructed that they would see the
back view of the PLA, while all other parameters remained con-
stant. This was possible because the PL stimuli being used were
ambiguous with regard to front vs. back view. While under front
view conditions, spatial and anatomical body side congruence
falls apart, the back view manipulation implies that spatial and
anatomical congruence corresponds, meaning that if the PLA and
the executed action involve the same body side (e.g., left arm),
they occur on the same side of the screen (left side). Hence, if spa-
tial congruence matters, a monotonic distance function should
occur in this condition.
However, the back view instructions revealed the same pat-
tern as was found under front view instructions (Springer
et al., 2011; Experiment 2). Specifically, the mirror-inverted con-
stellation (implying spatial congruence between executed and
observed movements) did not show a monotonic distance func-
tion. Therefore, the findings clearly contradicted a spatial congru-
ence account. This study suggests that action simulation engages
motor resources. The strength of the motor influences may
depend on the amount of structural overlap between observed
and executed actions (as defined by the anatomical side of the
body and the movement pattern involved).
Further evidence of this view comes from a study by Tausche
et al. (2010) examining effector-specific influences on the pre-
diction of partly occluded full-body actions of a PLA (cf. Graf
et al., 2007). While the movements observed were performed with
either the arms or the legs, the participants themselves responded
with a (different) movement involving either their arms or legs.
The results indicated that a correspondence between the effectors
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observed and the effectors used induced a motor interference
effect. Specifically, a monotonic distance effect, indicating real-
time simulation, emerged for the incompatible trials (involving
different effectors, i.e., arms and legs), whereas no such function
occurred for the compatible trials (involving the same effectors,
i.e., arms or legs).
Overall, these findings suggest that the accuracy with which
an acting observer predicts others’ actions may be influenced by
anatomical mappings between performed and observed actions
(Wapner and Cirillo, 1968; Sambrook, 1998; Gillmeister et al.,
2008; Liepelt et al., 2010). This influence may arise at the level
of effector-specific formats (Tausche et al., 2010; Springer et al.,
2011; cf. Springer et al., 2013). This view accords with the notion
that action observation activates the motor system in a corre-
sponding somatotopic manner (Decety and Grèzes, 1999, 2006;
Buccino et al., 2001; Grèzes and Decety, 2001).
DYNAMIC AND STATIC PROCESSES
As the above-described studies demonstrated, physical activity
does not appear to prevent participants from solving the action
occlusion task (Tausche et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2011). Hence,
additional and/or alternative processes may contribute to solving
this task. Can action simulation recruit additional processes that
are less motor-based when motor representations are constrained
by execution?
It has, in fact, been suggested that predicting actions over
visual occlusions may base on (at least) two different mental
operations: dynamic updating and static matching (Springer and
Prinz, 2010). Dynamic updating corresponds to an internal real-
time simulation that should be indicated by a monotonic distance
effect (i.e., performance should be best for time distances of 0ms
and should monotonically decrease for time distances of 300 and
600ms; as explained previously; cf. Section Simulation in Real
Time: The Occluder Paradigm). In the following, we use the term
real-time simulation (specifying the timing of an assumed internal
simulation process) synonymously with dynamic simulation and
dynamic updating.
In addition to dynamic updating, performing an action occlu-
sion task may involve a matching process, implying that the test
pose after occlusion is matched against a statically maintained
representation derived from the last action pose seen or perceived
prior to occlusion (Springer and Prinz, 2010). If static match-
ing takes place, performance in the action occlusion paradigm
should decrease with increasing pose times (i.e., 100, 400, or
700ms), irrespective of the actual duration of the occlusion
period, because an increase in the pose time implies a decrease in
the similarity between the last visible action pose (shown before
occlusion) and the test pose (shown after occlusion) by defini-
tion. Hence, while static matching in its pure form predicts a main
effect of pose time (but no interaction of occluder time and pose
time and, therefore, no monotonic distance function), real-time
simulation, in its pure form, predicts a strong interaction (emerg-
ing as a monotonic distance function), but no main effect of the
pose time factor.
A study by Springer et al. (2013) used body part priming to
address this issue. The participants played a motion-controlled
video game for 5min with either their arms or legs, yielding
conditions of compatible and incompatible effector priming rel-
ative to subsequently performed arm movements of a PLA.
The visual actions shown were briefly occluded after some time
(action duration of 1254–1782ms), followed by a static test pose.
Participants judged whether or not the test pose showed a spa-
tially coherent continuation of the previous action (as explained
previously; cf. Graf et al., 2007). While compatible effector prim-
ing (e.g., arms) revealed evidence of dynamic updating (i.e., a
monotonic distance effect, but no pose time effect), incompati-
ble effector priming (e.g., legs) indicated static matching (i.e., a
pose time effect, but no monotonic distance function). That is, in
the compatible effector priming condition, response accuracy was
best when the duration of occlusion matched the actual test pose
shown after the occlusion, indicating an internal representation
of the observed action was updated in real-time, thus match-
ing the actual test pose. In addition, response accuracy decreased
monotonically with increasing time difference between the dura-
tion of occlusion and the actual test pose (i.e., monotonic dis-
tance effect), corresponding to an increase of the time difference
between an internal real-time model and the actual action out-
come shown in the test pose. Hence, the findings of the compati-
ble condition supported real-time simulation (Graf et al., 2007).
On the other hand, in the incompatible effector priming con-
dition, evidence of real-time simulation was lacking (i.e., the
duration of occlusion did not interact with the actual action
progress shown in the test pose; see Figure 1). In this condi-
tion, however, response accuracy decreased with an increase in
the pose time factor, implying a decrease in the similarity between
the last visible action pose seen prior to occlusion and the test
pose seen after occlusion—irrespective of the actual duration of
the occlusion period. Thus, after being primed with incompatible
effectors, participants were more accurate in the action occlu-
sion task when the test pose shown was more similar to the most
recently perceived action pose seen prior to occlusion (pose time
effect). This effect cannot be explained by internal updating of the
last perceived action image. It supports static matching. Instead of
matching the test poses against real-time updated representations,
participants in this condition may have alternatively matched the
test poses against statically maintained representations derived
from the most recently perceived action pose, which were main-
tained and then used as a static reference for the match with the
upcoming test pose (Springer et al., 2013 cf. Springer and Prinz,
2010).
These results suggest that recognizing and predicting others’
actions engages two distinct processes: dynamic updating (simu-
lation) and static matching. The degree to which each process is
involved may depend on contextual factors, such as the compati-
bility of the body parts involved in one’s own and others’ actions.
Converging evidence comes from studies with a quite different
focus of interest, for example, studies using semantic priming as a
means of experimental context manipulation and addressing ver-
bal descriptions of meaningful actions, rather than the kinematics
involved in those actions.
SEMANTIC PROCESSES
The experiments we are going to consider now investigated
the relationships between the processes involved in predicting
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occluded actions and those involved in semantic processing of
verbal contents (Springer and Prinz, 2010; Springer et al., 2012;
cf. Prinz et al., 2013). A great deal of previous research has indi-
cated that motor processes are involved during the understanding
of language that describes action (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2005, 2008;
Andres et al., 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008). For instance,
while words denoting “far” and “near” printed on objects to be
grasped yielded comparable effects on movement kinematics to
the actual greater or shorter distances between hand position and
the object (Gentilucci et al., 2000), processing verbal descriptions
of actions activated compatible motor responses (e.g., Glenberg
and Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008) and supported the con-
duct of reaching movements when the verb was processed prior
to movement onset (Boulenger et al., 2006).
Towhat extent would verbal primesmodulate the internal sim-
ulation of actions under conditions of temporary occlusion? In
one study, the occluded action task was always preceded by a
lexical decision task (Springer and Prinz, 2010; Experiment 2).
Specifically, the participants judged whether a single word (onset
1250ms) was a valid German verb (which was the case in 75% of
trials, whereas pseudo-verbs appeared in the remaining 25 %).
While all 102 verbs shown (all of them in the infinitive form)
described achievable full-body actions, one half expressed high
motor activity (like springen—“to jump”) while the other half
expressed low motor activity (like stehen—“to stand”). This (rel-
ative) distinction of high vs. low motor activity resulted from an
independent rating of the words by 20 volunteers.
On each trial, the lexical decision task was immediately fol-
lowed by an occluded action task (as described previously) dis-
playing a familiar PLA involving the whole body (e.g., lifting
something from the floor, putting on a boot, or getting up from
a chair). Instructions for the two tasks were given to make them
appear to be completely unrelated to each other. However, as the
results clearly showed, verbal content affected performance in this
task.While lexical decisions involving high-activity verbs revealed
a pronounced monotonic distance function (taken as a signature
of internal real-time simulation), no such effect emerged for trials
involving lexical decisions about low-activity verbs. We took these
results as first evidence for the idea that the processes involved
in an occluded action task may be tuned by the dynamic qual-
ities of action verbs. To test this assumption, we ran another
experiment in which the same verbs were used, but they were
further differentiated according to the speed being expressed by
“fast,” “moderate,” and “slow” action verbs based on an additional
word rating (e.g., “to catch,” “to grasp,” “to stretch,” respectively;
Springer and Prinz, 2010; Experiment 3). While words expressing
fast and moderate actions produced a monotonic distance effect
(indicating real-time simulation), slow action words clearly did
not. That is, when the action occlusion task followed lexical deci-
sions about verbs denoting fast and moderately fast actions, the
monotonic distance function turned out to be more pronounced
and steeper compared to trials in which the task was preceded by
lexical decisions involving slow activity verbs.
These experiments suggest that language-based representa-
tions can affect the processes used for predicting actions observed
in another individual. However, because the prime verbs always
required lexical decisions, participants may have noticed that
some of the verbsmatched the visual actions, while others did not.
Therefore, when responding to the test poses after occlusion (i.e.,
deciding whether or not it depicted a coherent continuation of
the action), participants may have been more likely to give “yes”
responses after a “match” than a “mismatch” (e.g., Forster and
Davis, 1984).
To control for such strategy-based effects, we ran an additional
experiment in which the prime verbs were masked and did not
require any response at all (Springer et al., 2012). Specifically,
ten verbs that had been rated as very fast (e.g., fangen—“to
catch”) and ten verbs rated as very slow (e.g., lehnen—“to lean”)
were briefly presented (onset 33ms) embedded within a forward
and a backward mask consisting of meaningless letter strings.
Hence, people were not consciously aware of the verbal primes
and were unlikely to engage in any deliberate response strategies
(e.g., mapping the semantic content to the observed actions; see
Forster, 1998; Van den Bussche et al., 2009). Still, masked priming
revealed a similar result: While a pose time main effect was always
present, indicating static matching was involved, a pronounced
monotonic distance effect (taken to reflect dynamic updating,
i.e., real-time simulation) emerged for verbs expressing dynamic
actions, while it was lacking for verbs expressing static actions and
meaningless letter strings (Springer et al., 2012).
While masked words are not visible, they have still been shown
to access semantic processing levels (Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000;
Schütz et al., 2007; Van den Bussche and Reynvoet, 2007). Also,
when we used a non-semantic, purely visual priming of action
dynamics (by presenting dots rotating with slow, moderate, or
fast speed), a monotonic distance effect was lacking. Overall,
the observations from both conscious and unconscious priming
experiments seem to suggest that the semantic content implied
in verbal processing has an impact on procedural operations
involved in a subsequent occluded action task.
To better understand the nature of these effects the details of
the putative internal action representation during occlusions and
its underlying mental operations described above must be con-
sidered. Specifically, predicting occluded actions seems to imply
two processes: dynamic updating and static matching. Hence, the
observation that the slope of the monotonic distance function
(indicating dynamic updating) is more pronounced after pro-
cessing high-activity, as compared to low-activity action verbs,
suggests (at least) two different functional interpretations (cf.
Prinz et al., 2013). One is to consider a direct impact of verbal
semantics on simulation dynamics—in the sense that the degree
of activity expressed in the verbs affects the speed of simulation
(faster after processing high-activity verbs as compared to low-
activity verbs). The other alternative is that the distance function
actually reflects a blend of performance resulting from two ways
of solving the task: dynamic updating and static matching. While
dynamic updating relies on real-time updating of the internal ref-
erence against which the test pose is matched, static matching
relies on an internal reference that is static and may be derived
from the last posture seen before occlusion (Springer and Prinz,
2010; Prinz et al., 2013).
Based on a direct differentiation of the two processes, as
described previously (Springer et al., 2013), we argue that the
results by Springer et al. (2012) can be best understood as a blend
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of outcomes of static and dynamic processes. That is, seman-
tic verb content may modulate the relative contributions of two
processes, static matching and dynamic updating. While high-
activity verb contents invite stronger contributions of dynamic
processing than low-activity contents, low-activity contents may
promote stronger contributions of static processing.
In sum, the results from both explicit and implicit seman-
tic priming experiments suggest that semantic verbal contents
may impact on the mental operations involved when observers
engage in recognizing actions that are transiently covered from
sight (Springer and Prinz, 2010; Springer et al., 2012). Further
studies converge with this view, although addressing semantic
interference rather than priming effects (e.g., Liepelt et al., 2012;
Diefenbach et al., 2013). For example, Liepelt et al. (2012) found
evidence of interference between language and action, demon-
strating that word perception influences hand actions and hand
actions influence language production. Overall, one may con-
clude that internal action simulation and semantic processing can
access common underlying representations, a view that corre-
sponds to recent accounts of embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou,
2003, 2008; Zwaan, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005, 2008; Glenberg,
2008; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008, 2009).
A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION REPRESENTATION
This paper focuses on experimental research investigating action
simulation through systematic manipulation of the factors that
influence how we perceive and predict actions observed in other
people. While the studies discussed here differ according to a
number of methodological aspects, including postdictive and pre-
dictive types of measurements, as well as the features studied,
including the time course, sub-processes, and representational
grounds of action simulation, all of them involve variations of an
action occlusion paradigm (Graf et al., 2007; Prinz and Rapinett,
2008). This paradigm requires observers to evaluate the course of
actions that are briefly and transiently covered from sight. When
visual input is lacking, observers need to strongly rely on inter-
nally guided action representations. Thus, the paradigm allows
for systematic testing of the cognitive underpinnings of action
simulation and its internal processes and resources.
Several new insights emerged from the findings of these action
occlusion paradigms. First, action simulation enables observers
to render quite precise real-time predictions of others’ actions
(Graf et al., 2007; Parkinson et al., 2011; Sparenberg et al.,
2012). For instance, observers were highly accurate in differenti-
ating between time-coherent and time-incoherent continuations
of temporarily occluded human full-body actions (Sparenberg
et al., 2012) and spatially occluded human hand actions (Prinz
and Rapinett, 2008). Hence, action simulation may involve an
internal predictive process that runs in real-time with observed
actions. This process may act on newly created action represen-
tations rather than relying on continuous visual extrapolations of
observed movement trajectories (Prinz and Rapinett, 2008).
Second, action simulation seems to be highly susceptible to
subtle visual manipulations, indicating that it draws on percep-
tual representations of diverse aspects of human motion and
kinematic features, which may enable observers to develop highly
accurate predictions about actions observed even after quite short
phases of visual observation (Parkinson et al., 2012).
Third, action simulation can be influenced by an observer’s
own physical activity. Thus, the representational resources
involved in internal action simulation may be related to the
resources involved in motor execution. The strength of the motor
influences varied according to the degree of correspondence
between observed and performed actions, for instance, regarding
the effectors involved (Tausche et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2011).
Fourth, predicting actions through periods of occlusion may
involve two distinct processes: dynamic updating and static
matching.While dynamic updating corresponds to real-time sim-
ulation, static matching implies that recently perceived action
images are maintained as an internal reference against which
newly incoming action information can be matched. The rela-
tive proportion to which the two processes are used may depend
on contextual factors such as a correspondence of body parts
involved in performed and perceived action (Springer et al.,
2013).
Fifth, internal action simulation was affected by linguistic
processing of action-related words. While prime verbs describ-
ing dynamic actions corresponding to the observed actions (i.e.,
implying movement of the limbs) revealed evidence of dynamic
updating, this was not the case for those describing static actions
(implying nomovement of the limbs) (Springer and Prinz, 2010).
This occurs even if people are not consciously aware of these
action verbs and, thus, not prone to deliberate response strate-
gies, suggesting that action simulation may involve semantic
representational resources (Springer et al., 2012).
In the next section we are going to place the experimental evi-
dence in the wider context of major theoretical issues in the broad
domain of action and event representation.
REAL-TIME SIMULATION AND PREDICTIVE CODING
Several studies in which observers had to predict temporar-
ily occluded actions have shown that prediction accuracy was
best when the actions reappeared in a time-consistent manner
after occlusions. In addition, prediction accuracy systematically
decreased as the time gap between the duration of occlusion
and the temporal advance of the action stage shown after occlu-
sion increased (Graf et al., 2007; Springer and Prinz, 2010).
These findings correspond to the notion that action simulation
involves internal models that run in real-time with observed
action (Verfaillie and Daems, 2002; Flanagan and Johansson,
2003; Rotman et al., 2006). Furthermore, internal real-time sim-
ulation was affected by the observers’ own physical activity
(Tausche et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2011).
Possible explanations for these results come from a predic-
tive coding account of motor control (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007,
2009) and from the broader Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Prinz,
1990, 1997, 2006; Hommel et al., 2001). Efficient visuo-motor
control requires estimating one’s own body state prior to move-
ment execution, which is based on internal forwardmodels. These
internal forward models allow individuals to anticipate the sen-
sory consequences of their own movements in real-time based on
motor commands (i.e., efference copies; Wolpert and Flanagan,
2001). They may also operate when observers engage in pre-
dicting actions observed in others (Grush, 2004; Blakemore and
Frith, 2005; Prinz, 2006; Thornton and Knoblich, 2006; Kilner
et al., 2007). Internal sensorimotor simulations may contribute to
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perceptual processing by generating top-down expectations and
predictions of the unfolding action, allowing to precisely antic-
ipating others’ actions (see Wilson and Knoblich, 2005, for a
review).
According to TEC, codes of perceived events and planned
actions share a common representational domain. Perceptual
codes and action codes may, thus, influence each other on the
basis of this representational overlap. For instance, during dif-
ferent motor cognitive tasks (i.e., action observation or motor
imagery), the cortical representations of a target muscle and a
functionally related muscle were enhanced within a single task
and across different tasks, suggesting a topographical and func-
tional overlap of motor cortical representations (Marconi et al.,
2007; cf. Dinstein et al., 2007). This overlap may provide a basis
for anticipating others’ actions by mapping those actions onto
one’s own sensorimotor experiences (Jeannerod, 2001; Gallese,
2005).
The participants in the experiments reported here (Section
Representational Mechanisms) may have applied the same motor
representations that were activated during execution to predict-
ing a corresponding action observed. If so, the requirement to
internally simulate an observed action may be reduced when
observed and concurrently performed actions fully correspond,
because under this condition execution by itself may already
provide a continuously updated internal reference by which the
occlusion task can be solved. Hence, this condition yielded better
task performance than conditions in which observed and per-
formed actions were not (or only partially) similar to each other
(Springer et al., 2011). Given a complete lack of correspondence,
execution may strongly interfere with internal simulation (Prinz,
1997; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005) such that internal simulations
need to be shielded from information available from executing
a movement that is entirely different from the observed one.
Hence, this condition did not reveal evidence of internal simu-
lation but showed increased errors, suggesting interference from
execution to simulation (cf. Tausche et al., 2010). In fact, run-
ning real-time simulations of observed actions may be efficient
for solving the task only when executed and observed movements
are similar (but not when they are identical or fully incongruent
on each possible dimension) (Springer et al., 2011). Here, evi-
dence of real-time simulation was obtained, suggesting that the
cost/benefit ratio for running internal sensorimotor simulations
was more balanced, whether this is due to congruence in terms of
the anatomical body sides used (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005) or
the exact movement patterns involved in observed and performed
actions (Kilner et al., 2003).
In line with this view, the temporal predictions generated by
one’s own motor system for efficient motor control may also
be applied when predicting other people’s actions (Blakemore
and Frith, 2005; Kilner et al., 2007). Observers are able to quite
precisely predict not only the sensory consequences of their
own actions, but also those of others’ actions (e.g., Sato, 2008).
Furthermore, based on the observation of the communicative
gestures of an agent in dyadic interaction, they are able to ren-
der quite precise predictions about when the action of the second
agent will take place (Manera et al., 2013).
Neuroscientific studies have clearly shown the involvement of
motor brain regions in action observation (e.g., Gallese et al.,
1996; for a review see Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). This cor-
responds to the notion that an observer uses his or her motor
system to simulate and predict others’ actions (i.e., internal mod-
eling on the basis of the observer’s own sensorimotor experiences;
e.g., Jeannerod, 2001; see Schubotz, 2007, for a review). When
observers predicted transiently occluded full-body actions, dif-
ferent parts of the action observation network, including the
dorsal premotor cortex, were involved (Stadler et al., 2011).
Furthermore, grasp observation yielded increased activation of
this network, including the dorsal premotor cortex and poste-
rior parietal brain regions, which may reflect a motor simulation
process for object-directed hand actions observed (Ramsey et al.,
2012). Moreover, observing the start and middle phases of an
action sequence yielded higher motor facilitation than observing
the final postures of these actions (Urgesi et al., 2010), suggesting
that parts of the human motor system are preferentially activated
by predictive sensorimotor simulations of actions observed in
other people (Blakemore and Frith, 2005; Kilner et al., 2007).
DYNAMIC UPDATING AND STATICMATCHING
Several experiments have indicated that two distinct processes
may be involved when observers engage in predicting the future
course of other people’s actions: dynamic updating (corre-
sponding to real-time simulation) and static matching (Section
Representational Mechanisms). The relative contributions of
dynamic and static processes may depend on contextual factors.
For example, while priming the same effectors as perceived in
another person revealed evidence of dynamic updating, prim-
ing incompatible effectors clearly did not (Springer et al., 2013).
After incompatible effector priming, however, observers were bet-
ter able to predict an occluded action when the action stage
shown after occlusion was more similar to the most recently per-
ceived action pose (seen prior to occlusion). This effect cannot
be explained by internal real-time updating. It supports static
matching. Instead of being matched against real-time updated
internal models, test poses may, alternatively, be matched against
statically maintained representations derived from the most
accessible action pose, which are maintained and then used as a
static reference for the match with the upcoming action.
Adopting a common coding perspective (TEC; Prinz, 1990,
1997; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz and Hommel, 2002), partici-
pants may have mapped the (sensorimotor) representations used
for acting to solve the action occlusion task. If action repre-
sentations that were recently accessed could be mapped onto
the actions perceived due to common representational grounds
(i.e., due to effector compatibility), dynamic updating may be
strengthened because recently activated internal real-time models
(used for controlling one’s own actions) can be mapped onto the
perceived actions. Hence, using a compatible (but not incompat-
ible) effector may aid action prediction (Reed and McGoldrick,
2007) and may foster internal real-time simulation (Springer
et al., 2011).
On the other hand, if recently accessed action representations
are not (or are less efficiently) applicable to internal forwardmod-
els of perceived actions (due to effector incompatibility), real-
time simulation may be constrained (Prinz, 1990, 1997; Hommel
et al., 2001). Hence, incompatible effector priming fosters static
matching as an alternative process for solving the action occlusion
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task, that is, matching internally stored action images without the
involvement of (possibly conflicting) internal real-time models
(Springer et al., 2013).
Corresponding to this view, observers were generally more
accurate at predicting occluded actions after compatible than
incompatible body part priming (Springer et al., 2013). This find-
ing may suggest that real-time simulations yielded, overall, more
precise predictions than static matching. This view corresponds
to the notion that internal sensorimotor activation (simulations)
are used when predicting others’ actions (Blakemore and Frith,
2005; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Kilner et al., 2009) and that
action observation activates premotor brain regions in a somato-
topic way (i.e., reflecting the body parts being observed; Decety
and Grèzes, 1999, 2006; Buccino et al., 2001; Sakreida et al.,
2005).
ACTION SEMANTICS
Several experiments indicated that the precision by which
observers were able to predict the future course of an action
was affected by verbal primes (Section Semantic Processes). One
intriguing explanation for this is to assume that language-based
descriptions of actions may modulate the relative involvement of
two processes: dynamic updating (i.e., real-time simulations) and
static matching (as explained previously).
A large body of evidence shows that processing verbal infor-
mation is closely linked to information processing in sensory and
motor domains, indicating that activation of semantic knowl-
edge coincides with activation of corresponding sensory and/or
motor representations (Barsalou, 2003, 2008; Barsalou et al.,
2003; Glenberg, 2008; Kiefer et al., 2008; Pulvermüller, 2005,
2008; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008, 2009). Likewise, many stud-
ies have indicated that motor control may be closely linked to
semantic processing, such that the kinematics of ongoing move-
ments are affected by semantic processing (Gentilucci et al., 2000;
Glover et al., 2004; Boulenger et al., 2006, 2008).
Related to the studies reported here (Section Semantic
Processes), one may assume that verbs describing dynamic
action and implying movement of the limbs (corresponding
to the observed actions) act to strengthen the involvement of
dynamic updating over static matching due to common repre-
sentational grounds between meaning and movement (Barsalou,
2003, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2005; Glenberg, 2008). As a result,
dynamic updating was indicated when participants accessed verbs
expressing a dynamic action prior to an action occlusion task.
Correspondingly, static action verbs, which did not imply move-
ment of the limbs, did not indicate dynamic updating. Static
(and meaningless) primes may have favored the contribution of
static matching, thus, preventing an indication of dynamic updat-
ing from occurring (Springer and Prinz, 2010; Springer et al.,
2012).
This pattern was even observed when people were not aware of
the primes and were, thus, unlikely to have engaged in deliberate
task strategies (Springer et al., 2012). When the verbal descrip-
tions involved a coding of action dynamics that corresponded
to the visual actions, dynamic real-time simulation was indi-
cated. Hence, linguistic representations may trigger anticipatory
internal simulations, thus affecting the processes involved in an
action prediction task (Springer and Prinz, 2010; Springer et al.,
2012).
Overall, the observation of a semantic modulation of action
simulation converges with recent evidence supporting the notion
of close links between semantic processing and internal action
simulation (Liepelt et al., 2012; Diefenbach et al., 2013). This
view is consistent with embodied accounts, which hold that
understanding action language coincides (or even requires) inter-
nal sensorimotor simulations (or reactivation) of the described
action. In these theories, sensorimotor simulation is understood
as the activation of the same representations (and neural struc-
tures) that are derived from bodily experience, but in the absence
of overt performance (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Barsalou
et al., 2003; Zwaan, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005; Zwaan and Taylor,
2006; Barsalou, 2008; see Rumiati et al., 2010, for a review).
Recent evidence has clearly demonstrated cross-talk effects
between action language and execution (e.g., Nazir et al., 2008).
Processing action verbs modulated the kinematics of movements
relative to nouns without motor associations (Boulenger et al.,
2006). Parts of the motor system were activated when words
and sentences implying the corresponding actions (e.g., the same
effector) were perceived (Buccino et al., 2001; Aziz-Zadeh et al.,
2006). Pulvermüller et al. (2005) found somatotopic activity
in the motor cortex when participants were listening to face-
and leg-related action words; corresponding to the view that
motor regions of the brain are involved in action word retrieval
(Pulvermüller, 2005). Furthermore, reading hand-related action
verbs conjugated in the future enhanced the excitability of hand
muscles relative to reading the same verbs conjugated in the past
tense; indicating that an activation of predictive sensorimotor
simulations is not restricted to direct action observation but may
also be induced by action-related features derived from linguistic
stimuli (Candidi et al., 2010).
LIMITATIONS, OPEN QUESTIONS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One conclusion from several studies discussed in this paper is
that one mechanism by which a given action perception con-
text can modulate the precision of internal predictions about the
future course of other people’s actions is by altering the relative
contributions of dynamic and static processes. While dynamic
updating corresponds to an internal predictive simulation pro-
cess, static matching implies that most recently accessed action
representations are maintained and then retrospectively used for
evaluating newly incoming information (e.g., Springer and Prinz,
2010; Springer et al., 2013). However, although this model seems
to fit several of the studies we have discussed here, there are some
limitations and open issues to consider.
Firstly, neither of the two processes by themselves speaks to
the representational modality to which the operations pertain
(e.g., updating/matching in the visual and/or motor domain).
Possibly, predicting occluded actions may not rely on only one
representational domain but may involve alternating or simul-
taneous processes in different domains (e.g., visual driven static
matching and motor driven dynamic simulation). Likewise, the
order in which the two processes may run (e.g., trial-by-trial or
in parallel) is, at this point, an open question that needs to be
addressed in future work.
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Secondly, the accuracy of predicting (simulating) actions may
be moderated by individual characteristics such as age or senso-
rimotor expertise. While many studies have shown that higher
motor expertise goes along with stronger motor simulation dur-
ing observation of actions from the respective domain of expertise
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Cross et al., 2006; Aglioti et al., 2008;
Urgesi et al., 2012), only few studies have illuminated how the
aging process might interact with sensorimotor expertise dur-
ing action prediction (Diersch et al., 2012, 2013). Diersch et al.
(2012) found that figure skating expertise can improve both
young and older adults’ action prediction abilities when those
actions are within the observer’s domain of physical expertise.
Thus, sensorimotor expertise, even when acquired many decades
ago, may still strongly impact our ability to precisely predict oth-
ers’ actions. Thirdly, the interpersonal relationship between an
observer and the agent observed may matter. This may concern
close relationships (e.g., children, parents, or romantic partners)
and novel social partners (e.g., strangers). Taking self-generated
actions as an extreme illustration of actions to which observers
have privileged access, it has been shown that observers are most
accurate in predicting those actions that they are able to perform
themselves (e.g., Knoblich et al., 2002). Apart from allowing one
to regulate one’s own behavior, such privileged self-recognition
enables recognition of the effects of one’s own actions as being
self-generated (Jeannerod, 1999, 2003; Frith et al., 2000).
Although the focus scope of the current paper was quite
narrow, in that it focused on action simulation, experimentally
investigated by behavioral action occlusion paradigms, consid-
ering other strands of action simulation research, like modelling
studies (e.g., Fleischer et al., 2012) or studies focusing on the pro-
cessing of robot vs. humanoid form and motion (e.g., Saygin and
Stadler, 2012; see Gowen and Poliakoff, 2012, for a review), may
complement the work discussed here.
On a neuroscientific level, investigating the involvement of
common and/or distinct brain networks in relation to the dif-
ferent processes engaged in action prediction seems to be highly
promising (e.g., Schiffer and Schubotz, 2011; Ramsey et al., 2012;
cf. Szpunar et al., 2013). Yet, only few human fMRI studies have
examined action simulation by use of action occlusion paradigms
(Stadler et al., 2011; Diersch et al., 2013). In line with our notion
that predicting others’ actions recruits dynamic and static pro-
cesses, Stadler et al. (2011) found that different portions of the
premotor cortex play different roles in each of these aspects.
While the right pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) was
recruited for maintaining an internal reference of transiently
occluded actions, dynamic updating of internal action represen-
tations yielded increased activation in the pre-SMA and the dorsal
premotor cortex (PMd) (Stadler et al., 2011; see also Stadler et al.,
2012a).
In sum, the studies we have discussed in this paper collectively
suggest that action simulation can be conceived of as a highly
susceptible, dynamic process that runs in real-time with actions
observed, involving sensorimotor and semantic representations.
Moreover, when predicting the future course of other people’s
actions, dynamic simulations may co-exist with similarity-based
evaluations of statically maintained action representations (static
matching). The relative involvement of both processes, dynamic
simulation and static matching, may be tuned by contextual fac-
tors, like understanding action-related verbal contents, or actually
performing actions corresponding to those observed in other
people. This view corresponds to the general assumption that
an observer can use his or her own motor system to inter-
nally simulate and predict others’ actions (Grèzes and Decety,
2001; Jeannerod, 2001) and is compatible with a more specific
predictive coding account of motor control (e.g., Kilner et al.,
2007).
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